In the last twenty years, recorded messages and written notes have become a significant test and an intriguing puzzle for the semantics of indexical expressions (see Smith 1989 , Predelli 1996 , 1998a , 1998b , Corazza et al. 2002 , Romdenh-Romluc 2002 . In particular, the intention-based approach proposed by Stefano Predelli has proven to bear interesting relations to several major questions in philosophy of language. In a recent paper (Saul 2006) , Jennifer Saul draws on the literature on indexicals and recorded messages in order to criticize Rae Langton's claim that works of pornography can be understood as illocutionary acts -in particular acts of subordinating women or acts of silencing women. Saul argues that it does not make sense to understand works of pornography as speech acts, because only utterances in contexts can be speech acts. More precisely, works of pornography such as a film may be seen as recordings that can be used in many different contexts -exactly like a written note or an answering machine message. According to Saul, bringing contexts into the picture undermines Langton's radical thesis -which must be reformulated in much weaker terms. In this paper, I accept Saul's claim that only utterances in contexts can be speech acts, and that therefore only works of pornography in contexts may be seen as illocutionary acts of silencing women. I will, nonetheless, show that Saul's reformulation doesn't undermine Langton's thesis. To this aim, I will use the distinction Predelli proposes in order to account for the semantic behaviour of indexical expressions in recorded messages -namely the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
by conditioning people to regard women as willing sexual objects; it silences women by creating a communicative environment that deprives women of their illocutionary potential. In my paper I will not address this contentious claim, but focus exclusively on Saul's reformulation and critique. Saul argues that it does not make sense to understand works of pornography as speech acts, because only utterances in contexts can be speech acts: 'we need to focus not on works of pornography, but on something like pornographic utterances -viewings or makings, maybe -in contexts ' (2006: 237) .
In particular, works of pornography such as films, images or texts may be seen as recordings that can be used in many different contexts -exactly like a written note or an answering machine message. According to Saul, the question is to establish which context determines the speech act accomplished by a recording: a) the context in which it is recorded; b) the context in which it is heard or seen.
Saul examines the example of a sign reading 'I do' created by Ethel as a multi-purpose sign and used by her in different contexts to get married, to agree to return her books in time in a library or to confess to a murder. Intuitively, the different speech acts performed depend on features of the contexts in which Ethel used the sign, and not on features of the context in which she made it. Since some of the viewers are women, and some even feminist opponents of pornography, it follows that viewings of pornography are not illocutionary acts of subordinating women in all contexts. According to Saul, then, Langton's radical thesis must be reformulated in much weaker terms: only viewings of pornography are illocutionary acts, and only some of them are illocutionary acts of subordinating women. A conclusion far from sufficient to justify a strong condemnation of pornography.
